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THE ZUMWALT-CLASS DESTROYER
A Technology “Bridge” Shaping the Navy after Next
George V. Galdorisi and Scott C. Truver
The U.S. Navy’s decision to truncate procurement of the original fleet ofthirty-two guided-missile destroyers of the Zumwalt (DDG 1000) class to
just three ships does not diminish the value of the program to the United States
as a technology bridge to the “Navy after Next.” Rarely has the Navy had such an
opportunity to do just what the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions (CNO), Admiral Gary Roughead, directed in
early 2009: “To take advantage of the technologies, to
learn from them” and to prepare the Navy for the un-
certain “hybrid warfare” strategic environment of the
future.1 Testing, refining, and retesting these technol-
ogies and systems in a major surface warship can ac-
celerate the Navy’s efforts to provide robust, flexible,
and agile forces for tomorrow’s roles, missions, and
tasks. Indeed, the lead DDG 1000 offers the potential
to leverage today’s technology investments so as to
help shape the characteristics and capabilities of war-
ships yet to come.
PERSPECTIVE
Ninety years ago, the British military strategist and in-
ventor Major General J. F. C. Fuller understood that
“tools, or weapons, if only the right ones can be discov-
ered, form 99 percent of victory. . . . Strategy, command,
leadership, courage, discipline, supply, organization and
all the moral and physical paraphernalia of war are
Captain Galdorisi, USN (Ret.), is director of the Corpo-
rate Strategy Group at SPAWAR Systems Center Pa-
cific. During his thirty-year career as a naval aviator he
was commanding officer of Helicopter Antisubmarine
Squadron Light (HSL) 43 (the Navy’s first operational
LAMPS Mk III squadron), HSL-41, USS Cleveland
(LPD 7), and Amphibious Squadron 7. His last opera-
tional assignment was as chief of staff for Cruiser-
Destroyer Group 3. His most recent book is Leave No
Man Behind: The Saga of Combat Search and Rescue
(2009).
Dr. Truver is Director, National Security Programs, at
Gryphon Technologies LC. Since 1972 he has partici-
pated in many studies and assessments for government
and private industry, and he is the author, coauthor,
or editor of numerous papers and reports, several hun-
dred articles, and four books. He assisted in the devel-
opment of numerous Navy–Marine Corps strategy
papers, supported the interagency task force drafting
the U.S. President’s National Strategy for Maritime
Security (2005), and has done extensive work with the
U.S. Coast Guard related to Maritime Domain
Awareness, the National Fleet Policy, and future capa-
bilities requirements. Dr. Truver is a member of the
editorial board of this journal.
Naval War College Review, Summer 2010, Vol. 63, No. 3
NWCR_Summer2010.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Summer2010\NWCR_Summer2010.vp
Tuesday, May 11, 2010 8:49:01 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
1
Galdorisi and Truver: The Zumwalt-Class Destroyer
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
nothing to a high superiority of weapons—at most they go to form the one percent
which makes the whole possible.”2
Having the “right” tools or weapons, as described by Fuller, is important for
the United States and its allies and friends as they confront an ambiguous period
of both asymmetrical, low-technology warfare and the possibility of high-
technology warfare with China, a rejuvenated Russia, or other developing states.
However, the link between the invention of a new technology and its impact on
warfare is never a straight line. What has proved crucial has been the aggressive-
ness with which nations develop, test, improve, manufacture, and field these
technologies as weapons of war. In Global Trends 2025, the National Intelligence
Council addressed the importance of shepherding new technologies to the point
where they transition to the end users, noting, “The pace of technological inno-
vation will be key. Major technologies historically have had an ‘adoption lag.’”3
As the pace of global technological change has accelerated, the United States
has been especially adept at inserting new technology to pace the threat. As
Bruce Berkowitz points out in The New Face of War, “Recent experience sug-
gests that the right technology, used intelligently, makes sheer numbers irrele-
vant. The tipping point was the Gulf War in 1991. When the war was over, the
United States and its coalition partners had lost just 240 people. Iraq suffered
about 10,000 battle deaths, although no one will ever really be sure. The differ-
ence was that the Americans could see at night, drive through the featureless
desert without getting lost, and put a single smart bomb on target with a 90
percent probability.”4
Continuous technological innovation, experimentation, and insertion will
have a significant impact on the future of warfare, particularly to address the
“unknown unknowns” regarding which future technologies will be needed for
America’s military decades hence. For example, the U.S. Joint Forces Com-
mand’s Joint Operating Environment 2008 addressed the issue of technological
uncertainty by describing the astounding changes that have taken place in just
the last quarter-century alone:
One might also note how much the economic and technological landscapes outside
of the military have changed. . . . On the technological side, the Internet existed only
in the Department of Defense; its economic and communications possibilities and
implications were not apparent. Cellular phones did not exist. Personal computers
were beginning to come into widespread use, but the reliability was terrible.
Microsoft was just emerging from Bill Gates’ garage, while Google existed only in the
wilder writings of science fiction writers. In other words, the revolution in informa-
tion and communications technologies, taken for granted today, was largely unimag-
inable in 1983.5
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The U.S. Navy has a legacy of technology innovation and insertion, embrac-
ing both evolutionary and revolutionary changes, tempered by the understand-
ing that a navy’s ability to carry out its missions effectively has often depended
on who inserts the best technology the fastest and most effectively.6 As Rear Ad-
miral Jay Cohen, then Chief of Naval Research, noted in 2004, “The Navy/Ma-
rine Corps of today and tomorrow are and will remain critically enabled by the
power of science and technology put to work for our Sailors and Marines.”7
In addition to formal research and development programs and the much less
formal experimentation along the waterfront, the Navy has at various times in
its history taken good advantage of in-service platforms to insert and develop a
“bundle” of technologies—many dependent on each other—to test break-
through, leading-edge capabilities that have the potential to alter the face of na-
val warfare. For example, the first U.S. surface-to-air missile ships were the
eight-inch-gun cruisers Boston and Canberra, which were converted for the new
mission. Likewise, the submarines Barbero and Tunny were converted to launch
Regulus land-attack missiles, making them (as SSG 317 and SSG 282) the
world’s first operational missile submarines.
But unlike these examples, in which ships approaching the ends of their ser-
vice lives have been converted to experiment with new missions, DDG 1000 pro-
vides the Navy an opportunity to take emerging technology to sea not in a “test
ship” but in a frontline, battle-force, major surface warship.8 In that regard, the
surface warfare community can build on the U.S. submarine force’s experience
with the USS Memphis (SSN 691). In 1989, Memphis was designated an experi-
mental submarine to test a variety of technologies and systems, including ad-
vanced hull materials and structures, unmanned underwater vehicles, advanced
sonars, and bottom-profiler navigation systems. In 1994 the Navy assigned SSN
691 to Submarine Development Squadron 12. But all the while, Memphis re-
mained an operational asset—in May 2006 deploying to support Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM—and was included in the active force structure.
Using a new design and not an older ship to “test out” a variety of new tech-
nologies provides the Navy opportunity for experimentation on a scale not pre-
viously possible. In announcing his decision to truncate the DDG 1000 program
at just three ships, CNO chose words that emphasized the importance of this
ship as a technology incubator: “That’s why I was more interested in truncating
than terminating, so we can get a couple of ships out and see what they can do . . .
see if the technologies we put on [DDG 1000] are going to pay off for us.”9
LEVERAGING TECHNOLOGY “BUNDLES”
The “bundle” of technologies embodied in DDG 1000—as well as future tech-
nologies that could easily find homes in this ship—represents some of the most
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cutting-edge and transformational technologies ever adapted for naval uses: the
Integrated Power System (IPS); integrated electric drive; a stealthy tumblehome
hull and integrated topside (InTop) superstructure design; the 155 mm Ad-
vanced Gun System (AGS); the Mark 57 Peripheral Vertical Launching System
(PVLS); the Dual-Band Radar (DBR), which includes an S-band Volume Search
Radar (VSR) and X-band AN/SPY-3 Multi-Function Radar (MFR); and a host
of other advances related to network-centric warfare, stealth, survivability, and
dramatically reduced manning levels.
While some have criticized the Navy for embedding too many technologies
into DDG 1000, this perceived “weakness” is actually a strength, one that makes
this ship a credible host platform for the technologies that will accelerate the
leap to the Navy after Next.10 As DDG 1000 technologies continue to be tested
and matured, the ship should serve as the Navy’s surface platform—remember
Memphis—to evolve other advanced technologies as well into new warships.
But though the technologies currently embodied in DDG 1000 are on the
cutting edge, it is the ship’s potential to host even-farther-future, potentially
“game changing,” technologies that makes Zumwalt important. The fifteen-
thousand-ton ship has a 10 percent growth margin, equating to some 1,500 tons
of potential increase that would enable the ship to host new sensors and weap-
ons as technologies evolve.11 Inserting such systems into DDG 1000 throughout
the next decades and then improving on them, based on their operational effec-
tiveness and ability to deal with emerging threats, will define what the Navy will
look like—and how it can fight—in the future.
For example, as the Office of Naval Research has recognized, “Among the pos-
sibilities inherent in all-electric ships are the new weapons that become feasible
when virtually unlimited electric power is available on board.”12 Zumwalt’s ad-
vanced all-electric propulsion plant, generating seventy-eight megawatts of
power, allows such weapons as high-powered lasers and electromagnetic rail
guns to be used without significantly impacting the ship’s electronic surveil-
lance and weapons control systems or speed, a critical operational factor, given
the high electrical demands of these on-the-horizon weapons.
Such weapons are classified under the general heading of “directed-energy
weapons” (DEW), and they include high-energy lasers, radio-frequency weap-
ons (high-power microwaves or ultra-wideband weapons), and electromag-
netic rail guns.13 They are far from futuristic weapons that may or may not be
feasible; the Office of Naval Research is already developing (and working to
scale up the power of) free-electron lasers, chemical lasers and their associated
beam directors, radio-frequency weapons, and full-scale electromagnetic rail
guns capable of launching precision-guided projectiles at hypersonic speeds.14
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Indeed, independent assessments outside government have concluded that
solid-state lasers “are capable of making unique and important contributions to
U.S. military effectiveness.”15 The CNO has also directed that his Strategic Stud-
ies Group focus its latest deliberations on the impact that hypersonic and di-
rected weapons will generate on the future of naval operations in the 2020–25
time frame, noting that these weapons—both those employed by the U.S. Navy
and those of future opponents—have “the potential to profoundly influence fu-
ture maritime operations.”16
Modern rail-gun technology has been under development since the early
1980s and is projected to be a reality in the next decade. Ranges greater than two
hundred nautical miles are envisioned, using GPS-guided projectiles traveling
at six times the speed of sound. The fact that rail guns do not require powders or
explosives could free magazine space for strike and other mission areas.17
The potential impact of the electromagnetic rail gun on the support of forces
ashore likewise could be profound. The power supplied by an all-electric ship
like DDG 1000 is sufficient to fire up to twelve electromagnetic projectiles per
minute. A twenty-pound projectile could reach a target about three hundred
miles away in about six minutes. Initially traveling 8,200 feet per second and
striking its target at five thousand feet per second, that twenty-pound rail-gun
projectile will penetrate tens of feet of reinforced concrete through its kinetic
energy alone.
Directed-energy weapons could also become significant in terms of the way
the Navy after Next provides ship and task-force self-defense in the contested lit-
toral. A nation seeking to challenge the United States for control of local seas will
probably turn to cruise missiles, because these offer a relatively economical
method for conducting sophisticated attacks with a reasonable probability of in-
flicting damage on enemy ships off a coastline. Used to defeat a cruise missile
threat, directed-energy weapons could serve both as high-resolution sensors,
adding to capabilities provided by other Navy intelligence and surveillance sys-
tems, and as weapons, exploiting the advantages provided by a networked
force.18
Directed-energy systems provide several mechanisms for cruise missile en-
gagement and destruction. These weapons give the defender a speed advantage
of roughly six orders of magnitude, reducing the “time of flight” required to
reach an approaching missile. In the two to five seconds required to deposit laser
energy on a target, a Mach 4 missile will travel only about 3.5 nautical miles;
laser energy could destroy the attacker sixteen to eighteen nautical miles from
the defending platform—more than twice the best distance attained with con-
ventional systems.19 Embarked on mobile Navy warships, DEW could become
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the weapons of choice for defeating cruise missiles launched at naval formations
or for shooting down ballistic missiles launched against naval or other forces.
Swarming attack boats pose another significant challenge to naval ships oper-
ating in littoral waters. The severe damage inflicted upon the USS Cole (DDG
67) by one small, explosive-laden boat remains fresh in the minds of Navy plan-
ners. Directed energy offers the potential to disrupt the sensors of an attacking
small craft at the maximum line of sight. Even when fast attacking boats are dis-
cernible as threats, engaging them in the vicinity of friendly or neutral forces re-
quires more precision than is typically available with explosive ordnance.20 The
rapid responsiveness of directed-energy weapons makes them particularly use-
ful against high-speed patrol boats or surface-effect craft, which can effectively
outmaneuver conventional gun systems. The physical characteristics of directed-
energy systems give the defender greater control over the effects generated than
does any conventional weapon.21 Directed-energy weapons like the solid-state la-
ser and the high-power microwave are potentially superior to kinetic weapons
against swarming small boats—and the people who man them—for a number of
reasons, chief among them the ability to use these weapons in a graduated re-
sponse mode, where these swarming boats can be warded off with a succession of
effects, from nonlethal warning “shots” to lethal, accurate fire.
The prospect afforded by directed-energy weapons could represent for the
Navy and Marine Corps a potential paradigm shift in how the two services—as
well as the joint force—will conduct operations on and from the sea in the
twenty-first century. As the only feasible host platform for directed-energy
weapons for at least the next decade, DDG 1000 is the ship that will help pull
these technologies out of various laboratories and ground test sites and get them
deployed to sea, where they could revolutionize warfare at the tactical, opera-
tional, and strategic levels.
Hosting these directed-energy technologies on DDG 1000 offers the promise
of accelerating the development and refinement of these weapons in the opera-
tional environment. So doing will not only identify “the art of the possible” as to
what the Navy after Next can look like but also help determine if these technolo-
gies can deliver even a portion of their enormous potential. Directed-energy
weapons could be most useful in a future missile-defense role. They might be
able to target ballistic missiles in all phases of their trajectories—launch, boost
phase, and flight—thus helping to restore the odds for the defender. The long
range of directed-energy systems and their ability to target the sensitive sensor
and guidance systems of ballistic missiles make them particularly useful. If only
some of the full range of potential applications of directed-energy systems
proves effective, DDG 1000 will still have ably served as the prototype for the
high end of any “future surface combatant” family of ships.22
6 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
NWCR_Summer2010.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Summer2010\NWCR_Summer2010.vp
Tuesday, May 11, 2010 8:49:01 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
6
Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 3, Art. 5
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss3/5
THE TECHNOLOGY “BRIDGE”
U.S. military forces will have to operate and fight in a strategic environment
comprising a wide array of threats across the spectrum of violence, some of
which can only be imagined in 2010. Dealing with such a range of threats re-
quires that the United States avoid the technological surprise that will enable an
enemy to exploit military weaknesses and deliver an asymmetric blow that will
thwart what this nation seeks to achieve at the strategic, operational, or tactical
level. A former Vice Chief of Naval Research, Brigadier General Thomas
Waldhauser, U.S. Marine Corps, put this imperative in focus: “Given the current
national security challenges our nation faces and those we expect to face in the
future, we must keep our focus forward and push innovative technological solu-
tions to address those future threats.”23
But “pushing” those technologies out to the fleet and Fleet Marine Forces is
fraught with organizational and systemic challenges. “Transitioning” is an issue
of such concern that the Department of Defense asked the National Research
Council (NRC) to investigate the issues surrounding technology transition fail-
ures and the concomitant impact on the war fighter and to offer recommenda-
tions. The NRC provided a robust list of recommendations, but the title of its
final report—Accelerating Technology Transition: Bridging the Valley of Death for
Materials and Processes in Defense Systems—is a telling indicator of how difficult
this prospect remains. Significantly, the NRC concluded, “The adoption and ac-
ceptance of a new technology likely depends on the real or perceived impact of
that technology on high-level military goals.”24
The DDG 1000 program could overcome many of these transition challenges,
primarily because the ship represents an ideal platform for hosting still-emerging
technologies. For example, insertion of DEW technologies into DDG 1000 to
support future war-fighting requirements promises an orderly, evolutionary,
block-upgrade process, and it is consistent with the Defense Department’s em-
phasis on acquisition reform and with the Navy’s desire to exercise more stew-
ardship over its own acquisition programs.
This future has clearly captured the attention of Congress. The fiscal year
2010 National Defense Authorization Act calls for the Navy to develop several
plans and road maps, particularly for naval surface fire support—“to address
any shortfalls between required naval surface fire support capability and the
plan of the Navy to provide that capability”—and a technology road map for
future surface combatants and fleet modernization—“a plan to incorporate
into surface combatants constructed after 2011, and into fleet modernization
programs, the technologies developed for the DDG-1000 and the DDG-51 and
CG-47 Aegis ships, including technologies and systems designed to achieve
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significant manpower savings.”25 DDG 1000 provides important capabilities for
these and other requirements.
When the first DDG 1000 is delivered in 2013, the Navy should already have a
well developed technology-insertion and experimentation plan in place, if it is
to take advantage of this ship’s tremendous capabilities. In doing so, the Navy
will be able to leverage this ship fully and thereby accelerate the transformation
of tomorrow’s fleet into the Navy well after Next.
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Warfighter, p. 25. This now-five-year-old
ONR report was prescient in recognizing the
potential of the DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class de-
stroyer as the lead ship for the Navy after
Next, noting, “IPS and electric drive will rev-
olutionize surface ship and submarine
warfighting capabilities by increasing combat
effectiveness and agility while reducing own-
ership costs, space requirements, vulnerabil-
ity, and crew size. Indeed, IPS is critical to the
future development of the ‘all-electric
Navy.’”
23. Ibid., p. 2.
24. The National Research Council is a part of
the National Academies consortium,
comprising the National Academy of Sci-
ences, the National Academy of Engineering,
the Institute of Medicine, and the National
Research Council. This report, Accelerating
Technology Transition: Bridging the Valley of
Death for Materials and Processes in Defense
Systems (Washington, D.C.: National Acade-
mies Press, 2004), available at www.nap.edu,
notes, “Accelerating the transition of new
technologies into defense systems will be cru-
cial to achieving military transformation. . . .
Historical precedents for the transition of
new technologies into defense systems have
been neither fast nor efficient.”
25. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2010, Public Law 111-84, U.S. Statutes at
Large 123 (2009): 2190, sec. 125, Procure-
ment Programs for Future Naval Surface
Combatants.
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